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Abstract
Using a two-bloc endogenous growth model calibrated to two generic sending and
receiving countries of equal size, we assess the growth and welfare impact of world
migration flows of different skill compositions. The sending country (East) has a
lower total factor productivity and a lower endowment of skilled labour. Migration
can induce two growth-enhancing effects: an efficiency effect from the more efficient
use of labour in the receiving country (West) and a sectoral reallocation effect from
a fall in the host country skilled-unskilled wage rates. Despite growth gains there
are both winners (migrants, the representative Western non-migrant household) and
losers (the representative Eastern household remaining). Remittances can see the
latter group joining the winners.
JEL Classification: F22, F43, O41
Keywords: migration, endogenous growth, welfare, immigration surplus, emigration
deficit.
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1 Introduction
This paper assesses the economic impact of migration flows on both host (“West” from now
on) and sending (“East” from now on) regions. Our calibrated model is of the ‘new-growth,
new-trade’ genre where long-term growth is driven by innovation in the production of new
industries. The East is characterized by a lower total factor productivity in all sectors, a
relatively lower endowment of skilled labour and a lower initial capital stock. We examine
the impact of migration of different skill compositions. East-West migration induces two
potentially growth-enhancing effects: an efficiency effect from the more efficient use of
labour in the West and a sectoral reallocation effect arising from the change in the skilled-
unskilled wage rates. The first effect is studied by examining migration with no skill bias
and the second by examining migration of exclusively skilled labour. The case of unskilled
migration is analysed as well.
Migration from a poor East to a rich West is a politically contentious subject and
welfare analysis that carefully identifies the winners and losers can help to inform this
debate. We distinguish the original pre-migration population in the West (the ‘native’
population), the migrants and those remaining in the East. Each of these groups in turn
consist of skilled and unskilled household making six groups in total. The welfare impli-
cations of migration for the native population in the host country has received particular
attention in the migration literature. In an influential study Borjas (1995) calculates the
‘immigration surplus’ as the increase in income for this group following immigration. In
a one-country study calibrated to the US economy he shows that in the simplest model
without endogenous growth, assuming fixed capital and homogeneous labour, a 10% in-
crease in the workforce results in a very small income-based calculation of the immigration
surplus, around 0.1% in fact. The source of this gain is that immigration lowers the wage
rate and since the host population own the capital they benefit overall, though there are
losers (workers) as well as winners (owners of capital). Borjas goes on to show that the
introduction of skilled and unskilled types of labour can significantly increase the immi-
gration surplus. If the skilled-unskilled labour composition of immigrants differs from
that of the native population, a change in the relative wage enables firms to change the
composition of their workforce and reach an higher isoquant without increasing the total
cost of labour. This relative wage effect increases the Borjas estimation of the immigration
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surplus significantly. If, in addition, it is assumed that skilled labour and capital are com-
plements, then the final estimation of the immigration surplus arising from an increase of
10% in the US workforce can reach around 1%.
In a static analysis then three factors contribute to the immigration surplus: the fact
natives in the West own the capital, the relative wage effect and the complementarity of
skilled labour and capital. In our model with endogenous growth, if migration is growth
enhancing this provides a further contribution to the immigration surplus.1 However
the work of Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) and Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) in a
growth model with homogeneous labour and no capital highlights an important negative
contribution from immigration as a result of a reduction in the asset value of equity issued
to finance R&D. In principle this can dominate resulting in a negative immigration surplus
and indeed the results of these authors suggest this may be the case. We can reassess this
finding in a richer model of growth that includes physical capital and two types of labour.
As well as assessing the immigration surplus our two-bloc model allows us to estimate
the welfare effect on remaining households in the East–the ‘emigration surplus’. Our
results suggests a negative emigration surplus despite an increase in world growth that
benefits East and West. This emigration deficit becomes particularly large in the case
of skilled emigration from the East. This deficit arises from two sources: following Chui
et al. (2002) the less developed East passes through different stages of development as
its levels of total factor productivity and endowment of skilled labour converge to those
in the West. In the North-South model of Chui et al. (2002) we allow the South to
engage in copying and a combination of copying and innovation of blueprints produced
in the North. In this model we assume that Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) prevail
ruling out copying activity. This leaves two stages of development depending on whether
there is R&D activity and high-tech manufacturing in the East. In our pre-migration
baseline calibration we assume the East has some R&D and high-tech manufacturing.
Then skilled migration reduces the relative endowment of skilled labour in the East and
pushes the structure of the East into that with zero R&D and only traditional (low-tech)
1Drinkwater et al. (2007) revisits the Borjas study in an endogenous one-country endogenous growth
model along the lines of the two-bloc model of this paper. In a European context, calculations suggest
that skilled immigration can result in a utility-based immigration surplus of the order of a 4% equivalent
permanent increase in consumption, but unskilled immigration results in a negative immigration surplus.
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good production. Since the high-tech sector is characterized by imperfect competition
and positive profits this lowers income in the East. The second source of the emigration
deficit arises from a drop in the unskilled-skilled labour wage rates. Since the majority of
unskilled workers live in the East in our model, this further adds to the emigration deficit.
Our welfare analysis studies one mechanism that can turn the emigration deficit into
a surplus, namely remittances. In Drinkwater et al. (2009) evidence is presented from
20 lower and middle income countries, that include several European countries, indicat-
ing that 3.46 % of their GDP is equal to remittances. We examine the impact on the
welfare of remaining households in the East of a proportion of the income of migrants
(always the overwhelming winners in these studies) being transferred to them in the form
of consumption goods.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
theoretical literature on the effects of migration on growth. We mainly focus on the
contributions that links migration and growth driven by R&D, but limited space is given
to the other strands of the economic growth literature. Section 3 sets out the ‘core’
model without labour mobility. Section 4 sets out the balanced-growth steady state of
the dynamic model. Section 5 provides the welfare calculation for migrants, remaining
residents in the East and indigenous households in the West taking into account ownership
of assets. Each of these groups is divided into skilled and unskilled households giving six
groups in total. Section 6 sets out the numerical results and section 7 provides conclusions
and some suggestions for future developments of the model.
2 Related Literature
Many contributions to the literature on the effects of labour mobility on growth focus
on the impact of migration either on the source or on the receiving country. As pointed
out in Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002), the studies of labour migration in a one-country
endogenous growth framework have a series of limitations. The advantage of simplicity
is offset by a lack in reality. In the real world countries are connected by trade in goods.
Another drawback of the one-country endogenous growth literature is that it can not take
into account the incentives for labour mobility. Finally, migration is quite likely to have
a long lasting impact not only on the host country , but also on the source country. The
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latter effects can be positive or negative depending on the interplay between the effects of
growth, remittances and the brain drain.
A vast literature has emerged since the 1980’s which focus on the role of consumption
and saving decisions of households, the investment decisions of firms and public policy on
long-term growth. The impact of migration and in general of skill composition on long-
term growth is analyzed within models where growth is driven by physical and human
capital accumulation or, following Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (2001),
through the discovery of new goods and new processes (R&D). In the latter, the impact
of the skill level on growth is far more complex than the one described in the literature
where growth is driven by capital accumulation. It is based on the incentives to engage
in R&D activities and on the possibility to use skilled migrants in a more efficient way.
The following table synthesizes few studies on the impact of migration on growth:
One country Two countries
Human & Physical Capital Ben-Gad (2003) Walz (1995)
Research & Development Drinkwater et al. (2007) LS, Bretscher (2001)
Table 1. Examples of Studies Linking Growth and Migration
As an example of the literature based on human capital accumulation, Walz (1995) uses
a 2-bloc endogenous growth model to address the effects of migration on both source and
host countries. The central idea of the work is that migration affects the growth rate of the
economies by altering the composition of the labour force in each country. Migration can
be beneficial for individuals in both countries and if migration increases the overall growth
rate, the positive dynamic effects offset any negative static effects2 . In contrast with Walz
(1995), Ben-Gad (2003) considers a closed economy that opens only to include migration.
They extend Lucas (1988) model by introducing a labour-leisure choice. The introduction
of human capital externalities interacts with the analysis on the skill composition of the
migrants. The author shows that in the case of a modest intertemporal elasticity of labour
supply and returns to scale between 1 and 1.1, immigration lowers the growth rate in the
host economy.
Our paper is close to the literature that looks at the impact of migration in a 2-
country endogenous growth framework where technical change is driven by R&D (R&D
2The result depends on the initial specialization pattern.
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and two countries in the table) . The effects of migration from the East to the West
is examined by Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000, 2002) in a two-country quality ladders
model of economic growth and by Bretscher (2001) in an expansion-in-varieties model.
While Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) deals with the effects of international migration
between developed countries on growth, Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000) investigates the
potential impact of mass migration from middle-wage to high wage countries (e.g. from
former communist countries to actual members of the EU). In particular, in this second
paper the authors look at the desirability of large immigration quotas for both sending and
receiving countries. Migration generates static and dynamic effects from changes in wages
and from higher growth. The dynamic effects are in general positive but not sufficient to
compensate the negative level effects which generates losers among Northern workers and
Southern capitalists3. Northern capitalists are not particularly affected while migrants
and Southern workers are the clear winner in the analysis. The results of a negative impact
of migration on the welfare of natives contrasts with the findings obtained through static
models of migration as in Borjas (1995) and suggests that the attitude of natives towards
migrants can be associated with economic fears . An important feature of Lundborg and
Segerstrom (2000) is the evaluation of the model using computer simulations. This is due
to the difficulties generated by the assumption of two asymmetric countries. We retain
this feature in our work by relating the model to generic host and receiving economies
and assuming asymmetries between the two blocs. In contrast to our work, Lundborg and
Segerstrom (2000) assume homogeneous workers in a one-sector economy.
Our work is also close to Bretscher (2001) which examines the impact of the supply
of unskilled and skilled migration on the growth rate in open economies. By assuming
a specific utility function, the author shows analytically that there is an unambiguously
positive relationship between growth and an increase in the proportion of skilled labour.
Similar to our work, Bretschger assumes that the ranking of skilled labour intensiveness in
the sectors is traditional, manufacturing and R&D. In a version of this model, the author
looks at an expansion-in-varieties in the production sector which explicitly considers the
impact of migration on the incentives to generate new knowledge capital. In this case
unskilled migration has clearly negative effects on the growth rate, while migration of
3This result is driven by the assumption that the difference in R&D productivity in the two countries
is not large.
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high skilled has again unambiguously positive effects on the growth rate. In contrast
with our work, Bretscher (2001) does not assume asymmetries between the two countries
and growth depends only on the sectoral reallocation of resources. Bretschger and Steger
(2004) shows that migration depends on two effects: the scale effect and the sectoral
reallocation effect and the two could go in different directions. In particular, while the
scale effect is always positive, the sectoral reallocation effect is ambiguous in sign depending
on the elasticity of substitution between low and high skilled workers. In our model, the
increase in labour supply in the West induces both an efficiency effect and a sectoral
reallocation effect.
The importance of the skill composition of migrants on growth is also emphasised by
Drinkwater et al. (2007). The work, through simulations on an expanding in varieties
model with physical capital, general CES utility functions and Cobb-Douglas production
technology confirms, in a closed economy framework, most of the analytical results in
Bretschger. The main result of this model is that growth effects on the Immigration
Surplus come to dominate the purely static effects, but they are not sufficient to eliminate
the emergence of losers among natives competing with immigrants in the labour market.
Here we review the findings in Drinkwater et al. (2007) for open economies and examine
the impact of changes in labour supply on both host and source countries.
Finally, we take into account the impact of immigration on the terms of trade of the
host economy and show that immigration negatively affects its terms of trade. Davis and
Weinstein (2002) claim that immigration has a negative impact on native welfare through
worsening of the terms of trade of the home economy. The authors adopt a standard
Ricardian model amended to allow migration to a country (i.e. US or the West) which is
technologically superior in all factors. The main idea of their work is the following: when
the technologically superior country opens to trade it initially enjoys monopoly power. Im-
migration then amounts to an erosion of this power. World income increases, but natives
always loose. Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) explain how very often labour economists
focuses their analysis of migration on the complementarity relationship between immi-
grants and some domestic factors generating the so-called Immigration Surplus, leaving
goods prices exogenous. Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) points to the need to analyse the
complementarity effect together with the Davis-Weinstein (D-W) negative terms of trade
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effect. In our paper, the native welfare effect of immigration is the result of various oppos-
ing forces where technological complementarities and the terms of trade effects are only
part of a wider picture. In our simulations, we can see that high-skilled migration has
a negative impact on the terms of trade of the host economy as in Davis and Weinstein
(2002), but this is more than offset by the positive effect on endogenous growth. 4
A series of papers studies the impact of EU Enlargement on the old and new members
as in D’Auria and Morrow (2008) and Kahanec et al. (2009). Our model refers to EU
members when choosing some of the parameters used in the calibration, but we mainly
look at a generic “North” (West) and a generic “South” (East) when we assess the impact
of migration on growth and welfare.
3 The Model
In each bloc East (E) and West (W ), in the absence of specialization there are four
sectors: a high-technology manufacturing sector, m, produces an expanding variety of
differentiated goods; a traditional traded sector, y, produces a single traded homogeneous
good (e.g., food, steel); a traditional non-traded sector, z, produces another homogeneous
good (e.g., construction, services) and an R&D innovative sector, i, produces blueprints
for new manufactured goods. Sectors m, y and z use four factor inputs consisting of
skilled labour Hb, and unskilled labour Lb, b = E, W in the aggregate, and physical
capital consisting of inputs from the two traditional sectors. The ranking of unskilled-
skilled labour intensiveness is: z, y, m and i. The assumed market structures for outputs
are competitive for the traditional and R&D sectors and monopolistic for manufacturing.
Labour markets are assumed to clear and there are no free public services. In the basic
model there is no labour mobility between East and West. Migration between these blocs
is then considered in a subsequent section of the paper.
Asymmetries between East and West are a central aspect of this study. On the de-
mand side in our analysis we allow for the possibility that parameters (such as the discount
rate) defining consumer preferences differ between the two regions. Following Parente and
Prescott (2000) we assume that both East and West have access to the same common
4We present the result for high skilled migration, but a similar conclusion applies to the case of unbiased
migration as well.
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technologies, but the ability of firms to avail themselves of the best technology differ in
the two blocs, leading to different total factor productivities. Estimates from Hall and
Jones (1999) of total factor productivities for the US and some typical East and West
European economies are given in table 1 below. Since our focus is on long-run growth, the
question arises as to whether such large TFP differences will persist for long in the sending
economies. Estimates of TFP growth and labour productivity for Eastern and Western
Germany in the 1990s from Burda and Hunt (2001) show that in the first half of the
decade convergence was rapid, but in the second half it slowed down considerably leaving
Eastern labour productivity almost frozen at around two-thirds of that in the West. This
suggests that for the specific case of transitional economies we may expect some rapid
convergence at first, but that some significant East-West TFP productivity difference will
persist for some considerable time. This is what we assume in our simulations where the
TFP in the East stays always below the TFP in the West (two-thirds), though we only
examine the steady-state 5. The remaining differences between East and West are the
factor endowments of skilled and unskilled labour and initial capital stocks.6
Country YL TFP
USA 1.00 1.00
Italy 0.834 1.14
W.Germany 1.118 0.94
France 0.818 1.09
UK 0.727 1.01
Cyprus 0.446 0.737
Malta 0.463 0.812
Hungary 0.307 0.424
Czech 0.211 0.369
Poland 0.238 0.363
Table 2. Labour Productivity and TFP Differences between Countries (Hall
and Jones, 1999)
5An additional appendix C available from the authors contains the dynamic analysis of the model
6The latter however are irrelevant for the steady state results.
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3.1 Consumers and Aggregate Demand
In blocs b = E, W , consumers consist of two representative households. Types l = L,H,
supply fixed quantities of labour to the labour market and maximises an intertemporal
utility function,
U bl (t) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ
b(τ−t)
{ [(Cbml)θbm(Cbyl)θby(Cbzl)θbz ]1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σb
}
dτ ;
∑
i=m,y,z
θbi = 1, σ
b 6= 1;
(1)
where ρb is the subjective discount rate, σ < 1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, Cbyl and C
b
zl are total consumption of the traditional traded and non-traded goods
respectively by type l; and Cbml, an index of consumed manufacturing goods by households
of type l, takes the form
Cbml =
[∫ n
0
(xblj)
αdj
]1/α
; α ∈ (0, 1), (2)
due to Dixit-Stiglitz, where n is the total number of varieties available, α is a taste pa-
rameter and xbjl is consumption of variety j by type l in bloc b.
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The consumers’ optimization problem consists of two stages. Let pmj be the price
of manufactured variety j and py, pbz, b = E,W be the prices of the traded and non-
traded traditional goods. Then the first stage is the current period maximization of
(Cbml)
θm(Cbyl)
θy(Cbzl)
θz over the varieties given total nominal household expenditure for
each group of workers, Cbl =
∫ n
0 [pmjx
b
jl]dj + pyC
b
yl + p
b
zC
b
zl. This is a standard problem
which yields demands
Cbyl = θ
b
y
Cbl
py
; Cbzl = θ
b
z
Cbl
pbz
; xbjl =
θbmC
b
l p
−ε
mj∫ n
0 p
1−ε
mj′dj
′ ; l = L, H, ; b = E,W (3)
where ε = 1/(1 − α) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Hence the total nominal
consumption of manufactured goods in bloc b by households of type l is given by∫ n
0
pmjx
b
jldj = θ
b
mC
b
l = PmC
b
ml (4)
where Cbml is real consumption and
Pm =
[∫ n
0
p1−²mj
] 1
1−²
(5)
7Notice the elasticity ² = 1/(1 − α) is assumed to be equal across all varieties wherever they are
produced.
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is the price index for manufacturing. Finally the profit-maximizing choice of output by
the firm producing variety j requires the total world demand for the variety j given by
xj =
∑
b=E,W
(xbLj + x
b
Hj) =
[∑
b=E,W θ
b
mC
b
]
p−εj∫ n
0 p
1−ε
j′ dj
′ (6)
where Cb = CbL + C
b
H is total households’ nominal expenditure in bloc b.
The second stage of the consumers’ problem is intertemporal. Net assets, Abl , held by
households of type l consist of an equity stake in new blueprints, domestic physical capital
in all sectors and claims on domestic and foreign residents. Arbitrage in capital markets
within each bloc ensures equality on the return rb from these assets. This implies budget
constraints for the groups l = L,H of the form:
A˙bL = r
bAbL + w
b
LL
b − T bL − CbL; A˙bH = rbAbH + wbHHb − T bH − CbH , (7)
where wb = [wbL, w
b
H ] are the wage rates and [T
b
L, T
b
H ] are non-distortionary taxes paid by
the two groups. Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3) and (7) gives another standard result:
C˙bl /C
b
l − P˙ b/P b = σb(rb − P˙ b/P b − ρb) ; l = L,H (8)
where
P b = (Pm)θ
b
mp
θby
y (pbz)
θbz (9)
is the price index for total consumption in bloc b. Hence aggregating over the two types
of household we have
C˙b/Cb − P˙ b/P b = σb(rb − P˙ b/P b − ρb) (10)
The budget constraint for aggregate net assets wealth is,
A˙b = rbAb + wbLL
b + wbHH
b − Cb, (11)
In each region manufacturing firms have identical costs and all firms, East or West, face
an identical demand given by (6). Hence pj = pW , j = 1, 2, · · ·, nW and pj = pE , j =
nW + 1, nW + 2, · · ·, n where n = nW + nE . Then from (5) we now have that Pm =[
nW (pW )1−² + nE(pE)1−²
] 1
1−² . We can now write aggregate assets in region b as:
Ab = AbL +A
b
H = n
bvb + pyKby + p
b
zK
b
z + F
b (12)
where nb varieties with stock market value vb are produced in bloc b and Kby and K
b
z are
aggregate levels of physical capital created from the two traditional sectors and F b are net
claims of bloc b on residents in the other bloc (a negative value implies a liability).
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3.2 Accounting Identities and Eastern Debt
Let Bbj ; j = y,m denote the trade balance in traded sector j. Then the accounting
identities are:
pyY
b = py(Cby + K˙
b
y + δyK
b
y) +B
b
y (13)
Zb = Cbz + K˙
b
z + δzK
b
z (14)
pbmn
bxb = PmCbm +B
b
m (15)
where δy, δz are the depreciation rates for the three types of capital. If financial capital is
mobile, rE = rW = r, say, and foreign assets held by each bloc accumulate according to:
F˙ b = rF b +Bby +B
b
m (16)
and FW = −FE , in this two-bloc world. From (16) this is equivalent to the world trade
balance condition
BWy +B
W
m +B
E
y +B
E
m = 0 (17)
However open-economy models with capital mobility of this genre have some implausible
properties, discussed in Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995), chapter 3. One way of resolving
this difficulty is to assume that the bloc that borrows is credit-constrained and can only
borrow up to its holdings of other assets; i.e., if it is the East that borrows then liabilities
FW are constrained by AE ≥ 0. With credit constraints interest rates rW and rW can
diverge. In the complete absence of capital mobility, interest rates can diverge and the
trade must balance implying
Bby +B
b
m = 0 (18)
We can set up the model to incorporate capital immobility as a special case of constrained
mobility as follows. The credit constraint takes the form:
FW ≤ φ(nEvE + pyKEy + pzKEz ) = φaE (19)
say, where φ ∈ [0, 1] is the maximum proportion of Eastern assets, aE , owned by Western
households. Then (16) applies and rW = rE = r iff FW < φaE . Otherwise the credit
constraint binds, rW 6= rE necessarily and (16) is replaced with
φa˙E = rWφaE +BWy +B
W
m (20)
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3.3 The Traditional Sectors
Turning to the supply side, since the traditional sectors are perfectly competitive, the
price is equal to the marginal cost. If both regions produce the traded traditional good,
global price equalization then gives the following equality
py = ΓEy (w
E,RE) = Γwy (w
W,RW). (21)
where Γby(·) is a cost function and Rb = [Rby,Rbz ] are the net costs (rental prices) of the
two types of physical capital. Equating the returns on capital to rb we have
Rbj = p
b
j [r
b + δj −
p˙bj
pbj
] ; j = y, z (22)
In (21), unit cost functions Γby(w
b,Rb), b = E,W , for the traded traditional sector and
the corresponding unit factor requirements are derived from the following, CES production
function
Y b = T by
[
[γ1yL
µy
y + γ2yH
µy
y ]
ηy
µy + [γ3yK
ξy
yy + γ4yK
ξy
zy ]
ηy
ξy ]
] 1
ηy
;
4∑
j=1
γjy = 1 (23)
for factor inputs [Ly,Hy,Kyy,Kzy] into the y-sector. In (23), σµy = 1/(1 − µy) is the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour, σξy = 1/(1 − ξy) is the
elasticity of substitution between the two types of physical capital and σηy = 1/(1− ηy) is
the elasticity of substitution between labour of either type with physical capital of either
type.8
We assume identical technology is available in both blocs apart from the total factor
productivity, T by , which can differ. We assume that the East is inefficient relative to the
West in all sectors. If this inefficiency is uniform across sectors, with our constant returns
to scale production functions this can be interpreted the quality of skilled, unskilled labour
and physical capital in the West being uniformly higher than in the East (in addition to the
proportion of skilled workers being higher). Alternatively (or in addition) the inefficiency
could be caused by barriers to innovation as in Parente and Prescott(2000) in which case
it need not be uniform across sectors.
8An alternative specification for the CES production function assumes a common rate of substitution
between unskilled labour on the one hand, and skilled labour and all types of physical capital on the
other; i.e., Y b = T by
[
[γ1yL
ηy
y + [γ2yH
ξy
y + γ3yK
ξy
yy + γ4yK
ξy
zy ]
ηy
ξy ]
] 1
ηy
. Then ηy > 0 and ξy < 0 captures the
empirical possibility that skilled labour and physical capital are complements (Hammermesh (1993)).
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For the non-traded traditional sectors prices in each bloc can differ and (21) becomes
pbz = Γ
b
z(w
b,Rb) ; b = E,W (24)
where unit cost functions Γbz(w
b,Rb), b = E,W are derived from an analogous CES
production function
Zb = T bz
[
[γ1zLµzz + γ2zH
µz
z ]
ηz
µz + [γ3zKξzyz + γ4zK
ξz
zz ]
ηz
ξz ]
] 1
ηz ;
4∑
j=1
γjz = 1 (25)
for factor inputs [Lz,Hz,Kyz,Kzz,Kmz] into the z-sector.
3.4 Manufacturing firms
Given factor inputs [Lm,Hm,Kym,Kzm], production in the manufacturing sector produc-
ing variety j is given by a CES production function analogous to (23)
xbj = T
b
m
[
[γ1mLµmm + γ2mH
µm
m ]
ηm
µm + [γ3mKξmym + γ4mK
ξm
zm]
ηm
ξm ]
] 1
ηm ;
4∑
j=1
γjm = 1 (26)
from which the cost functions Γbm(w
b,Rb) are derived as before.
The manufacturing firm in either bloc producing variety j at price pj where j ∈ [0, n]
maximises profits, pij = (pbj −Γbm)xbj with xbj given by (6). For identical firms in each bloc,
this yields equilibrium price, output, profits and manufacturing price index:
pb =
Γbm
α
(27)
xb =
θmC(pb)−²
P 1−²m
(28)
pib = (1− α)pbxb (29)
Pm =
[
nE(pE)1−² + nW (pW )1−²
] 1
1−² (30)
Notice that since ² > 1, Pm is a decreasing function of the number of varieties, n = nE+nW .
3.5 The Innovative Sector and Knowledge Capital
The innovative R&D sector employs mainly labour and the rate of production of new
goods invented in this sector is given by the production function
n˙b = T bi Λ
[
[γ1iL
µi
i + γ2iH
µi
i ]
ηi
µi + [γ3iK
ξi
yi + γ4iK
ξi
zi ]
] 1
ηi ;
4∑
j=1
γji = 1 (31)
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where Λ is knowledge capital. Our treatment of knowledge capital differs from much
of the literature in that we adopt a formulation that does not lead to the empirically
troublesome conclusion that growth increases with population size. The basic idea is that
a new blueprint emerging in the R&D sector contains new ideas and information useful
to future generations of innovations but these diffuse gradually in time and through the
population. Let LE +HE + LW +HW = N say, be the total world’s working population.
In fact, later we normalise N = 1. Let n = nE + nW be the total number of varieties in
the world. Then knowledge capital Λ is defined by
Λ =
n
N
(32)
i.e., knowledge capital depends on the density of varieties in the population and not on
the absolute number. This small change in the usual formulation (for example adopted in
Grossman and Helpman (2001)) removes the world population size effect on growth. Notice
also that knowledge capital is independent of the distribution of populations between East
and West and is therefore unaffected by migration.
3.6 The Financial Sector
Let the stock market value of the typical R&D firm in bloc b be denoted by vb. A new
blueprint costs Γi(wb,Rb)/Λ, and the NPV rule requires this to be equated with vb, giving
vb =
Γi(wb,Rb)
Λ
. (33)
The no-arbitrage condition is
pib
vb
+
v˙b
vb
= rb (34)
the left hand side is the total rate of return to equity holders (dividend plus capital gains)
and rb denotes the interest rate on riskless loans between households. If
pib
vb
+
v˙b
vb
< rb (35)
then no innovative goods are created in bloc b.
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3.7 Factor Equilibrium Conditions
If all labour markets clear labour market equilibrium condition for each type of labour are
abLi
Λ
n˙b + abLmn
bxb + abLyY
b + abLzZ
b = Lb (36)
aHi
Λ
n˙b + abHmn
bxb + abHyY
b + abHzZ
b = Hb (37)
The model is closed with the equilibrium conditions for the remaining factors, Ky and Kz.
abKyi
Λ
n˙b + abKymn
bxb + abKyyY
b + abKyzZ
b = Kyb (38)
aKzi
Λ
n˙b + abKzmn
bxb + abKzyY
b + abKzzZ
b = Kzb (39)
3.8 Summary of Model
Consumption Demand
Cbz =
θbzC
b
pbz
(i)
Cby =
θbyC
b
py
(ii)
Cbm =
θbmC
b
Pm
(iii)
xb =
(θEmC
E + θWm C
W )(pbm)
−²
P 1−²m
(iv)
C˙b
Cb
= (1− σb) P˙
b
P b
+ σb(rb − ρb) (v)
Aggregate Demand
pyY
b = py(Cby + K˙
b
y + δyK
b
y) +B
b
y (vi)
Zb = Cbz + K˙
b
z + δzK
b
z +G
b (vii)
pbmn
bxb = PmCbm +B
b
m (viii)
Assets
Ab = nbvb + pyKby + p
b
zK
b
z + F
b = ab + F b (ix)
A˙b = rbAb + wbLL
b + wbHH
b − n
bΓbis
b
Λ
− Cb (x)
Eastern Debt and World Balanced Trade Condition
if FW < φae then rW = rE = r and F˙W = rWFW +BWy +B
W
m
otherwise rW 6= rE and φa˙E = rWφaE +BWy +BWm (xi)
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BEy +B
E
m +B
W
y +B
W
m = 0 (xii)
Capital Returns
Rby = py[r
b + δy − p˙y
py
] (xiii)
Rbz = p
b
z[r
b + δz − p˙
b
z
pbz
] (xiv)
Traditional Sectors
pbz = Γ
b
z(w
b,Rb) (xv)
py = Γby(w
b,Rb) (xvi)
Manufacturing Sector
pbm =
Γm(wb,Rb)
α
(xvii)
pib = (1− α)pbmxb (xviii)
Aggregate Price Indices
Pm =
[
nE(pEm)
1−² + nW (pWm )
1−²] 11−² (xix)
P b = P θ
b
m
m p
θby
y (pbz)
θbz (xx)
Financial Sector
vb =
Γi(wb,Rb)
Λ
(xxi)
pib
vb
+
v˙b
vb
≥ rb (xxii)
World Knowledge Capital
Λ =
nE + nW
N
(xxiii)
Factor Equilibrium
abLi
Λ
n˙b + abLmn
bxb + abLyY
b + abLzZ
b = Lb (xxiv)
aHi
Λ
n˙b + abHmn
bxb + abHyY
b + abHzZ
b = Hb (xxv)
abKyi
Λ
n˙b + abKymn
bxb + abKyyY
b + abKyzZ
b = Kyb (xxvi)
aKzi
Λ
n˙b + abKzmn
bxb + abKzyY
b + abKzzZ
b = Kzb (xxvii)
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Assume (xxii) holds with equality so innovation occurs in both blocs. Four of these
equations, (xi), (xii), (xix) and (xxiii) refer to the world, the remaining 23 to each bloc.
For the case where the credit constraint binds, this gives us 4 + 2 × 23 = 50 equations
in total in endogenous variables Cbz , C
b
y, C
b
m, C
b, xb, Y b, Zb,Kby,K
b
z , B
b
y, B
b
m, n
b, pbm, pi
b, pbz,
W b, vb, rb, P b, wbL, w
b
H , R
b
y, R
b
z, b = E,W and py, Pm,Λ which total 23 × 2 + 3 = 49
variables. Where the credit constraint does not bind rW = rE but we have one more
endogenous variable FW .
There appears to be too many equations. However our general equilibrium model
describes an equilibrium in world traded output, and in non-traded output, the finan-
cial sector and labour markets in each bloc. By Walras’ law we know one of the latter
equilibrium conditions is in each bloc superfluous. If we eliminate one financial market
relationship describing Ab then we can dispense with equation (ix) reducing the equations
by 4 and the variables by 2. In fact, for the case of capital immobility with Bb = 0
from (ix) and (x) and (xxii), a little algebra gives
Cb + vbn˙b + pyK˙by + p
b
zK˙
b
z = w
b
LL
b + wbHH
b + nbpib + (rb + δ)(pyKby + p
b
zK
b
z) (41)
which is a national income identity equating expenditure (Cb) and investment in shares
issued to finance new blue prints (vbn˙b) plus investment in physical capital with labour
income plus profits. Therefore, we can dispense with (ix) and (x). This leaves us with 46
equations in 47 endogenous variables – one equation short. However, there is nothing to
pin down the price level in our model and we are free to choose any nominal variable as
the numeraire.
4 The Steady State
Assume consumer preferences are identical in East and West. We also confine ourselves to
the case of capital immobility (i.e, φ = 0 in (xi). We seek a balanced-growth steady state in
which shares of manufacturing varieties ξb = n
b
n are constant, the growth of varieties in the
world produced by each bloc are equal and constant; i.e., n˙/n = n˙E/nE = ˙nW /nW = g,
all prices, wage rates, nominal consumption, nominal output and total nominal financial
wealth (nv) are all constant. Then we have v˙b/vb = −g ; b = E,W , P˙ /P = θmg/(1− ²) =
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−θmg(1− α)/α < 0 and Λ = n/N . Let Xb = nbxb be manufacturing output 9. Then the
steady state takes the form
r = ρ+
1− α
α
θmg
(
1
σ
− 1
)
(42)
Ab = nbvb + pyKb + pbzKz = Nξ
bΓi(wb,Rb)(1− sb) + pyKby + pbzKbz (43)
py = ΓEy (w
E ,RE) = ΓWy (w
W ,RW ) (44)
pbm =
1
α
Γbm(w
b,Rb) (45)
pyY
b = θyCb + δpyKby +B
b
y (46)
pbzZ
b = θzCb + δpbzK
b
z (47)
pbmX
b = θmCb +Bbm (48)
Bby +B
b
m = 0 (49)
REy = R
W
y = py(r + δ) (50)
Rbz = p
b
z(r + δ) (51)
r + g =
1− α
α
Γbm(w
b,Rb)
Γbi(wb,Rb)(1− sb)
Xb (52)
Lb = NξbabLi(w
b,Rb)g + abLm(w
b,Rb)X + abLy(w
b,Rb)Y b (53)
Hb = NξbabHi(w
b,Rb)g + abHm(w
b,Rb)Xb + abHy(w
b,Rb)Y b (54)
Kby = Nξ
babKyi(w
b,Rb)g + abKym(w
b,Rb)Xb + abKyy(w
b,Rb)Y b (55)
Kbz = Nξ
babKzi(w
b,Rb)g + abKzm(w
b,Rb)Xb + abKzy(w
b,Rb)Y b (56)
ξE + ξW = 1 (57)
giving 30 equations in 30 variables g, r, Ry, py and Ab, pbm, X
b, Y b, Kby, K
b
z , B
b
m, B
b
y, ξ
b, Cb,
Rbz, w
b = [wbL, wH ]
b, b = E,W . We choose nominal GDP as the numeraire. Exogenous
parameters driving the equilibrium are ρ, α, σ, θm, θy (describing the preferences of
consumers), the depreciation rates δ, technology parameters T bj , γkj , ηj , ξj ; k = 1, 2, · · ·, 3,
9As noted in Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000, 2002) individuals experience identical growth rates in
consumer utility while utility levels can differ. This is because the two economies are connected by trade
and consumers in both countries benefit from any new innovation. In the model we seek a balanced-growth
steady-state in which the share of manufacturing varieties is constant, the growth of varieties in the world
and in each bloc are equal and constant, all prices, wage rates etc. are all constant. In general, the
conclusion that trade leads to one world growth rates relies on the assumption of international spill-overs.
See Feenstra (1996) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for details.
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j = y, z,m, i, for the four sectors of the traditional good, manufacturing and R&D and
exogenous endowment proportions Lb and Hb.
The additional relationship which is rendered superfluous by Walras’ Law is
Cb = rbAb + wbLL
b + wbHH
b − ξbΓbi(wb,Rb)sb (58)
GDP is defined as value added in the R&D sector (n˙bvb), plus that in the m, y and z
sectors: i.e., by
GDPb = ξbΓbig + p
b
mX
b + pyY b + pbzZ
b (59)
in the steady state. Define as proportions of nominal GDP mb = pbmX
b/GDP b and
similarly define yb and zb for bloc b = E,W . Define the R&D and consumption shares as
rdb = 1 − xb − yb − zb = Γbiξbg/GDP b and cb = Cb/GDP b respectively. Define relative
GDP as relE = GDPE/GDPW . Then the steady state becomes:
wbLa
b
Li
Γbi
rdb +
wbLa
b
Lm
pbm
mb +
wbLa
b
Ly
py
yb +
wbLa
b
Lz
pbz
zb =
wbLL
b
GDP b
≡ wageLb
wbHa
b
Hi
Γbi
rdb +
wbHa
b
Hm
pbm
mb +
wbHa
b
Hy
py
yb +
wbHa
b
Hz
pbz
zb =
wbHH
b
GDP b
≡ wageHb
abKyi
Γbi
rdb +
abKym
pbm
mb +
abKyy
py
yb +
abKyz
pbz
zb =
1
δpy
(yb +mb − (θm + θy)cb)
abKzi
Γbi
rdb +
abKzm
pbm
mb +
abKzy
py
yb +
abKzz
pbz
zb =
1
δpy
(zb − θzcb)
relErdE
ΓEi
+
rdW
ΓWi
= g
r = ρ+
(
1
σ
− 1
)
θmg
²− 1
Ry = pWy (r + δ)
RWz = p
W
z (r + δ)
REz = p
E
z (r + δ)
ΓWy = Γ
E
y
(r + g)rdW = (1− α)mW g
(r + g)rdE = (1− α)mEg
mW + relEmE = θm(cW + relEcE)
mW
mE
=
ΓEi rd
W
ΓWi rdE
(
pWm
pEm
)1−²
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Noting that pbm =
Γbm
α , py = Γ
b
y and p
b
z = Γ
b
z, this gives us 18 equations in endogenous
variables xb, yb, zb, cb, wageLb, wageHb, Rbz (b = E,W ), Ry, r, rel
E and g. When there
is no R&D in the East then rdE = xE = 0. Nominal Western GDP is chosen as our
numeraire.
5 Immigration and Welfare
We now turn to the balanced growth steady state of the full model as set above. Our
calculations of the immigration surplus are based on pre- and post-migration equilibria and
require distinguishing between the asset accumulation of migrants and the host country
workers.
5.1 Asset Accumulation following Migration
At time t let Ml(t), l = L,H be the numbers of Eastern households of type l who have
migrated in the post-migration state. Let L¯b and H¯b be the pre-migration levels of post-
migration steady states of the two skill types. Then the working populations of the two
skill types are given by
LE = L¯E −ML ; LW = L¯W +ML
HE = H¯E −MH ; HW = H¯W +MH (60)
We make no distinction between the worker of the same skill type in the two blocs.
Nor do we allow for discrimination against immigrants in the Western labour market. As
a consequence the only change on the supply side arises from the numbers of workers of
each type. However the consumption/savings decisions of the migrants must be considered
separately.
Following migration starts we need consider three residential groups of workers: mi-
grants who have settled in the West; the remaining residents in the East and non-migrants
in the West. We use a superscript q = M,N,E to refer to these groups. Thus Western
assets can now be divided into those held by the M and N groups; i.e., AWl = A
M
l +A
N
l for
each skill type l = L,H. Similarly consumption in the West by the l-type can be written
CWl = C
M
l +C
N
l . Assume that migrants accumulate their assets in the West. Aggregating
over skill types as before and writing Aq = AqL+A
q
H , q =M,N,E and A
b = AbL+A
b
H , and
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similarly for consumption, the household budget constraints for migrants, non-migrants
in the West and remaining workers in the East are then given by
A˙M = rWAM + wWL ML + w
W
H MH − TM − CM (61)
A˙N = rWAN + wWL (L
W −ML) + wWH (HW −MH)− TN − CN (62)
A˙E = rEAE + wELL
E + wEHH
E − TE − CE (63)
Aggregating (61) and (62) gives
A˙W = rWAW + wWL L
W + wWH H
W − CW (64)
where T q are taxes paid by group q. Thus, with our three assumptions – homogeneous
labour of the same skill type between blocs, no discrimination against immigrants and
migrants invest their assets with in the West – the budget constraints, consumption and
savings decisions aggregate in a straightforward manner. The only economic effect on the
aggregate economies arises from the change in working populations given by (60). However
the welfare of our six groups need to be calculated separately and this requires that the
assets of each group are carefully identified following migration from East to West.
Total assets in the West of which groups q = N,M have some share are given by
A¯W = ξ¯W Γ¯i + p¯yK¯y
W + p¯Wz K¯z
W in the pre-migration state owned by the total pre-
migration population and AW = ξWΓi + pyKWy + p
W
z K
W
z after migration that increases
the total Western population to NW = (1 + M)N¯W where M = ML+MH
N¯W
is the total
migration rate. First consider the accumulation of the physical capital component of these
assets. For the y-sector, after migration, in the new steady state KWy − K¯Wy of capital
accumulates which now has value py(KWy −K¯Wy ). Migrants don’t bring capital with them,
but do save and share in the newly accumulated capital and acquire M1+M py(K
W
y − K¯W )
leaving non-migrants with their initial holding, now valued at py and their share of the
new capital, 11+M py(K
W − K¯W ). Treating capital in the z-sector and equity similarly we
arrive at the total assets of Western non-migrants and migrants as
AN =
Γi(Mξ¯W + ξW )
1 +M
+
py(MK¯Wy +K
W
y )
1 +M
+
pWz (MK¯
W
z +K
W
z )
1 +M
(65)
AM =
MΓi(ξW − ξ¯W )
1 +M
+
Mpy(KWy − K¯Wy )
1 +M
+
MpWz (K
W
z − K¯Wz )
1 +M
(66)
In the East remaining households own all the assets AE = ξEΓEi + pyK
E
y + p
E
z K
E
z .
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Finally we need to divide assets between skilled and non-skilled households within
categories q = N,M,E. We assume this division corresponds their labour income; i.e.,
A¯NL =
w¯WL L¯
W
w¯WL L¯
W + w¯WH H¯W
A¯N ; A¯NH =
w¯WH H¯
W
w¯WL L¯
W + w¯WH H¯W
A¯N
in the pre-migration state with an analogous division in the post-migration state. We have
now determined holdings of assets for skilled and unskilled non-migrants in the West,
migrants and non-migrants remaining in the East before and after migration. We now
turn to the calculations of welfare for these six groups.
5.2 Welfare Calculations
Given steady state assets and labour income we can now determine total consumption of
unskilled non-migrants from (62) in the pre-migration state as
C¯NL = r¯A¯
N
L + w¯L¯− TNL
with obvious analogous expressions for the post-migration state, for skilled non-migrants
and for the other four group, q = M,E l = L,H. We are now in a position to calculate
the immigration surplus based on the change in utility following migration
The utility of non-migrants group of skill type l = L,H is given by
UNl (t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
{ [(CNml)θm(CNyl )θy ]1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σ
}
dτ ;
∑
i=m,y
θi = 1, σ 6= 1;
Consider T periods after migration and assume T is large enough for the model to have
reached its new balanced-growth steady state. Then n˙/n = g, its steady state value, or
n(t) = n(T )eg(t−T ) for t > T . Then the steady-state welfare is calculated as:
UNl =
1
1− 1/σ
[
(CNl /P˜ )
1−1/σn(T )θm(1−1/σ)/(ε−1)
ρ− θ(1− 1/σ)g/(ε− 1) −
1
ρ
]
; l = L,H
= UNl (C
N
l , n(T ), g) (67)
say, where P˜ b =
(
pbm
θbm
)θbm (pby
θby
)θby (pbz
θbz
)θbz
.
To calculate the welfare based immigration surplus we compare the utility before and
after migration at the same pre-migration level of varieties, n(T ) = n¯, say. We measure
this change in utility in terms of an equivalent permanent consumption change as follows.
Let ∆U ql be change in utility coming about from a 1% permanent change in consumption
22
at the pre-migration steady state at n(T ) = n¯ calculated by perturbing consumption in
(67). Then using the notation indicated in the latter equation, the immigration surplus
for the two types of worker, in terms of an equivalent % change in utility, is obtained as
Immigration Surplus =
UNl (C
N
l , n¯, g)− UNl (C¯Nl , n¯, g¯)
∆UNl
; l = L,H (68)
Note that this expression is independent of our choice of n¯. Similarly we define the welfare
gain in terms of equivalent permanent changes in consumption for the migrants and the
remaining Eastern residents as
Migration Surplus =
UMl (C
M
l , n¯, g)− UMl (C¯Ml , n¯, g¯)
∆UMl
; l = L,H (69)
Emigration Surplus =
UEl (C
N
l , n¯, g)− UEl (C¯El , n¯, g¯)
∆UEl
; l = L,H (70)
6 Results
The impact of migration in the host and in the receiving country is a result of counteracting
forces. Some authors focus on the impact on wages and on labour market conditions in
general as in Borjas (1995). Others, as Lundborg and Segerstrom (2000 and 2002) look
at the negative impact on the asset value of equity issued to finance R&D. Finally, other
authors focus on the negative impact of migration on the terms of trade as in Davis and
Weinstein (2002). In our general equilibrium framework the factors that contribute to
the immigration/emigration surplus/deficit are: technological complementarities, terms
of trade, change in asset prices, efficiency and sectoral reallocation effects. The mentioned
static and dynamic effects have often a counteracting impact on the economic welfare at
home and abroad. For this reason, we now turn to numerical solutions of the steady state
using the calibrated parameter values set out in table 5. Refer to Appendix A for details
on the calibration procedure. For a particular choice of TFP in the East we examine
the effect of East-West migration with different skill compositions. Though all the effects
are present in our simulations, by concentrating on migration with and without skill bias
keeping the other parameters fixed, we focus our analysis on the efficiency and the sectoral
reallocation effects of international migration.
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6.1 East-West Migration
In the next two sections we consider the case where the East is relatively less endowed
with skilled labour with LW = HW = 0.25, whereas LE = 0.3 and HE = 0.2. In addition
TFP is less in the East and we put TFPW = 1.75TFPE .
6.1.1 Migration with no Skill Bias
Figures 1 and 2 shows the effect of a 10% increase in the Western population from immi-
gration with no skill bias in its composition. An increase in growth now occurs of 0.25%
which is almost entirely the result of a movement of workers from a country with a low
TFP to one with a high TFP (the efficiency effect). All sectors in the West grow as they
absorb the immigrant workers. The transfer of workers from a less to a more efficient
R&D sector sees the Western share of new products rise and world growth rises. The
consequent increase in demand for high skill labour causes the relative skill-unskilled wage
in both blocs to rise. There is a small rise in the Western R&D share rdW and a small
decrease‘in rdW .
The effect of these changes on welfare is summarised in figure 1, (b) to (e). Figure 1(e)
shows the world surplus worked out as the equivalent % permanent change in consumption
for a representative household consisting of skilled and unskilled workers, East and West at
weighted according to post-migration proportions. The maximum world surplus is around
9% when migration reaches 10% of the Western workforce. This breaks down into 1% for
Western skilled workers, about 0.5% for native unskilled workers, giving an immigration
surplus of around 0.85% for the representative Western native household (figure 1b). For
those remaining in the East skilled workers gain by over 0.75%, unskilled workers lose by
-1.35% giving an emigration deficit for the representative Eastern non-migrant of about
-1.2% (figure 1c). Finally figure 1(d) shows that the representative migrant gains by a
substantial 200%. In summary, with our parameter values, the positive efficiency effect
comes to dominate the potential static negative effects highlighted in the literature.
6.1.2 Migration with Skill Bias
We now show the impact in our model of a 10% in the Western population from immi-
gration with skill bias. A change in the composition of labour will have an impact on the
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way resources are allocated between the differen sectors (sectoral reallocation effect) with
a positive or negative impact on growth depending on the type of migration we are con-
sidering. In this framework with biased migration, the manufacturing and R&D sectors
play an important role. Our next set of simulations in figures 3 and 4 look at the effect
of a 10% increase in the Western population consisting of skilled workers. Now there are
additional reallocation effects in both blocs arising from the changes in the proportions of
skilled to unskilled workers. Taken together with the efficiency effect of a movement from
a less to a more efficient economy, growth now rises by over 0.5% (figure 3a). The world
surplus now rises to 11% (figure 3e). The immigration surplus is almost 12% for unskilled
natives, -2.5% for skilled natives averaging at almost 6 % (figure 3b). The emigration sur-
plus is 17% for skilled, -50% for unskilled averaging at -10% (figure 3c), but both skilled
and unskilled migrants gain substantially again (figure 3c). Finally, figure 4(f) shows the
effect of high skilled migration on the terms of trade of the host country. Migration now
has a negative impact on the terms of trade of Western countries. See Appendix B for
details on the terms of trade. This result, in line with Davis and Weinstein (2002), shows
that even with a negative terms of trade effect, which is part of our general equilibrium
analysis, high skilled migration is beneficial for the economy 10. Different results apply in
case of unskilled migration. 11.
We then look at the impact of a 10% increase in the Western population consisting of
unskilled migration. As shown in Drinkwater et al. (2007) unskilled migration will have
a negative impact on the world growth rate 12. Respect to skilled migration, now we
have a symmetrical sectoral reallocation effect due to a change in the opposite direction
of the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers in the West, but there is still a positive
efficiency effect due to a movement of workers from a country with a low TFP to one with
a high TFP. The world surplus is now a modest 0.4%. The emigration surplus is 13% for
10In this paper we only focus on Cobb-Douglas technologies, but in Drinkwater et al. (2007) we show
that when skilled labour and capital are complements, the complementarity improves the impact of skilled
migration
11see below
12In Drinkwater et al. (2007) we also investigate the impact of migration on the immigration surplus for
different degree of complementarities and we show that when skilled labour and capital are complements
changes in asset prices can have a significant effect and that the complementarity worsens the impact of
unskilled migration.
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unskilled and -12% for skilled while the immigration surplus is 5% for skilled natives and
-16% for unskilled natives. See figure 5.
The main result that is emerging is that while unskilled migration can decrease growth,
migration of no-skill bias and skilled migration from a low to a high TFP region of the
world can increase growth, but in the absence of some distribution mechanism there are
winners and losers, with remaining non-migrants in the latter category. The reason is that
the East sees a reduction in its share of high tech goods which involve a price mark-up
over marginal cost, and the relative wage of the unskilled workers fall. Indeed from figure
4b skilled migration of over 5% of the West workforce sees the R&D and high-tech sectors
disappear altogether in the East.
One possible distribution mechanism is through remittance between migrants and their
families remaining in the East. We then look at the effects of skilled migrants remitting
a given percentage of their income ranging between 0% and 50%. Assuming that fami-
lies are either entirely skilled or unskilled, these remittances will end up in the pocket of
skilled households in the East. This group were winners in the absence of remittances so
remittances in themselves do not mitigate the distributional effects of migration. However
if we assume that intra-country distributional mechanisms exist, or that households are of
mixed skilled type, then we can focus on the representative household in both blocs. Then
we can show that at any remittance rate above around 35%, migrants remain substantial
winners, and the Eastern representative household begins to emerge as a winner. These
welfare effects with remittances are summarized in table 3.
Type of Migration Growth Effect (%) IS (%) ES (%)
Unbiased 0.3 0.85 -1.2
Skilled 0.5 5.5 -8.0
Skilled with 50% remittances 0.5 5.5 7
Table 3. Growth, Immigration Surplus (IS), Emigration Surplus (ES) of Rep-
resentative Households.
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7 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper examines the impact of migration from a poor East to a rich West of dif-
ferent skill compositions where the East is characterized by a lower TFP and a lower
skill-unskilled labour ratio calibrated to reproduce observed differences in the size of the
traditional and high-tech sectors in a typical host and in a typical sending region. Our
results may be summarised as follows
1. East-West migration induces two effects: an efficiency effect from the more efficient
use of labour in the West and a sectoral reallocation effect arising from the change in
the skilled-unskilled wage rates. The first effect is studied by examining migration
with no skill bias and the second by examining migration of exclusively skilled labour.
2. Both types of migration result in a increase in world growth in the steady state.
Skilled-labour migration results in a shift out of the high-tech sector in the East
so that eventually at a level of migration over to 5% of the Western population
that sector disappears altogether. Then Eastern specialization in traditional sectors
occurs.
3. Despite growth gains there are winners and losers. With skilled migration, skilled
households gain in the East and lose out in the West. The representative West
household gains but its Eastern counterpart loses out. The overwhelming winner
is the migrant herself. An important redistributive mechanism that can mitigate
these distributional effects is the existence of remittances. In our simulations a
remittance rate of around 35% still leaves the skilled migrant better of and sees the
representative household in the East joining her counterpart in the West as a winner.
4. Unskilled migration, as expected, has a negative impact on the world growth rate
due to the dominance of the now negative sectoral reallocation effect.
There are a number of ways in which the model presented here can be developed. First,
we have assumed away labour market imperfections. There are many ways of modelling
these: the search-matching approach to migration of Ortega (2000) is one promising di-
rection to go. Second, fiscal instruments can be made available to the policy-maker such
as a migrants’ tax. Fourth, there are unexplored issues associated with the modelling of
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endogenous growth. The removal of scale effects can be handled in other ways (see, for
example, Segerstrom (1998), Li (2000). We have restricted capital formation to traditional
sectors for theoretical convenience. It is not obvious how to obtain balanced growth paths
with constant prices if we allow for capital formation in the high-tech expanding sector
and this needs to be investigated further.
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A Calibration
To relate the model to two typical host and sending economies, the first requirement of
the exercise is to identify which types of labour relate to the categories of ‘skilled’ and
unskilled’ and which sectors constitute traditional, high-tech manufacturing and R&D.
We will assume identical consumer preferences for migrants and non-migrants.
To carry out the simulations the following parameter values are required:
Utility Weights, Elasticities and Discount Rates: θm, θy, θz, σ, α and ρ.
Capital Depreciation Rate: δ.
Production Function Weights, Elasticities and Total Factor Productivities:
γkj , k = 1, 3; j = m, y, i, z, ηj , ξj , j = m, y, i, z, Tj , j = m, y, i, z.
Pre-Migration unskilled and skilled labour proportions: (L¯, H¯)
The procedure commonly referred to as the ‘microeconomic approach’ to calibration
(see, for example the discussion in Shoven and Whalley (1992) chooses values for weights
in utility and production functions to be consistent with observations of data in the form
of averages of sector shares, factor shares within each sector, the real interest rate and the
growth rate over a number of years. Elasticities in production are selected using economet-
ric estimates. Our baseline calibration assumes Cobb-Douglas production technology.13
Then all the parameters are re-calibrated so that the steady state of the model is
consistent with the original data. Notice we assume µ and η are the same in all three
sectors.
We use econometric estimates for σ and δ and various sources on price mark-ups for
α. From table 5 the following are chosen: σ = 0.4, δ = 0.1 and α = 0.7. Estimates of the
depreciation rates lie around this value as reported in Canova (1994), Canova and Ortega
(1996) and Canova and Ravn (2000). 14
13Simulations with a generalized CES production function to investigate the case where skilled labour
and capital are complements are presented in Drinkwater et al. (2007) for the one-country model. We
remain faithful to the main result reached by the relevant literature in our choice of a Cobb-Douglas
production function for the baseline calibration. From GTAP (Global Trade, Assistance and Production)
where GTAP is a large computable general equilibrium model (see Hertel et al, 2001) estimates for the
elasticity of substitution between skilled/unskilled and labour/capital, it seems clear that this parameter is
close to 1 so that the production function can take approximately the Cobb-Douglas form. This functional
form is often assumed in many aggregated studies.
14Estimates for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution were found in Ogaki and Reinhart (1998).
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We refer to Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a) and Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999b) for
the estimates of the preference of variety α. The average mark-up in the high tech sector
(Chemical, Trans. Equipment, etc.) is 1.13 where the mark-up is defined as ²²−1 =
1
α .
This implies that our parameter for the preference of variety, according to Kohler et al.
estimates is αAustria = 0.8. If we decide to include German data for the estimate of
the mark-up in the high tech sector, we can refer to table 8 of the German case by the
same authors. They give estimates of the mark-up in Chemicals and we refer to it as an
industry representative of the high tech sector. The mark-up is 1.43. This gives us a value
of αGermany = 0.68. This leaves us with a weighted average value of αWest = 0.7 (i.e. we
take Austria and Germany as representative countries). The literature in general confirms
a central value of α equal to 0.7.
In the pre-migration equilibrium this leaves parameters [Ti, ρ, θm, {γkj}, k = 1, 2; j =
y,m, i, z] = Θ, say, to calibrate. Then θy = 1− θm completes the calibration.
On the production side, units of output and factor inputs can be chosen such that
Tm = Ty = Tz = 1.15 Let sLj , sHj be the factor shares of unskilled and skilled workers
respectively in sector j = i,m, y, z as evaluated in the balanced growth steady state of
our model. Denote data for these shares by sˆLj , sˆHj . We obtain data for the technology
parameters from Kohler et al. (1999) by aggregating the 29 sectors included in their
economy. 16
Point estimates range from 0.32 to 0.45 and so we choose a value σ = 0.4.
15We choose units of output, skilled and unskilled labour and capital such that Lj = Hj = Kj = 1 results
in one unit of output in sector j = y,m, z. Then in our constant returns to scale production function we
have that Tj = 1.
16They rely on Input/Output data for the Austrian economy complemented by auxiliary ones (e.g.,
the Industrial Characteristics Data). We refer to Table A.17 in Kohler et al., following an aggregation
in line with the classification of Burda and Hunt (2001) for the following estimates of the factor shares
sij ; i = L,H,K; j = y,m, i, z: sij =
∑nj
`=1 sij`/nj i=L,H,K and j=y,m,i,z where ` represents the industry
in the j sector (i.e. farming, fishing, etc,) and nj the number of industries included in the aggregated j
sector.Traditional Traded: sLy = 0.27 as an average of the following numbers:
Farming=0.462 Fishing=0.46 Fuel Extracts = 0.12 Mining=0.23 Food=0.23 Text=0.39 Leather=0.27
Wood=0.26 Paper=0.22 Manufacturing=0.24. Similarly, sHy = 0.43 is obtained as an average of: Farming
=0.482 Fishing=0.425 Fuel Extracts=0.24 Mining=0.33 Food=0.47 Text=0.41 Leather=0.50 Wood=0.45
Paper=0.50 Manufacturing=0.49. Under this assumption, the share for capital in the traditional traded
sector is equal to sKy = 1 − sLy − sHy = 0.30. sLm = 0.17 is obtained as an average of: Chemical=0.20;
Plastic=0.32; Machines=0.18; Electrics=0.19; Transp.Equipment=0.22; Finance=0.05; Real Estate=0.07;
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We also refer to Table A.17 in Keuschnigg and Kohler to obtain numerical values
for the proportions of skilled and unskilled in the economy. The authors refer to the
Austria Skill data set and the values are obtained by considering the arithmetic average
of three different definitions of skilled and unskilled labour.17 Factor shares of skilled
labour, unskilled labour and capital are reported as 48%, 22% and 30% respectively. This
is consistent with equal numbers of skilled and unskilled labour assumed in the baseline
calibration if the skilled/unskilled wage ratio is 2.15:1, which is reasonable.
Let p̂mXpyY+pzZ be data for the relative nominal outputs in the manufacturing and tradi-
tional sectors respectively. To obtain estimates of the dimension of each sector, we look
at the value added reported in Burda and Hunt (2001) in Table 10. 18
As specified in Grossman and Helpman (1991), the high tech sector (i.e. electrical
machinery, electronics, office machinery, chemicals, etc.) accounts for nearly of all spending
on industrial R&D in the OECD countries (OECD 1989). This implies that 1.05 of R&D
comes from the high tech Sector and the remaining 0.35 comes from the traditional sector
(traded/non-traded). Other sources are OECD data which confirm a size of about 2%
for R&D. According to Parente and Prescott (2000) there is one category of investment
expenditures which are not included in the national accounts, namely investments in
intangible capital. We may consider including some of these investments as part of the
R&D sector. R&D expenditures do not entirely consist of the costs of perfecting the new
Health=0.18. In a similar way sHm sHz and sLz sKm and sKz are obtained.
R&D: Referring again to tables in Keuschnigg and Kohler, assuming that the Education Sector is repre-
sentative of the R&D sector: sLi = 0.076, sHi = 0.882, sKi = 0.042
17Definition 1 : Individuals with apprenticeship level of education or lower are treated as unskilled, the
remainder being treated as skilled labour. Definition 2 as before but individuals with apprenticeship are
considered skilled. Definition 3: assistant and semi-trained workers are treated as unskilled.
18We choose West Germany (Berlin excluded) as a representative country for the West and look at
the composition of value added with reference to 2000. Traditional: Agriculture and forestry=1.1 ;
Trade/Eating and Drinking+ Transportation=17.5; Low Tech Industry=10; Construction =4.3 ; Public
and Private Services=19.8; Leasing and Business Services=10.7; Total Dimension = 64% ((Tradi-
tional traded=0.29% and Traditional untraded=0.35%). High Tech Manufacturing: High
Tech Industry =16%;Banking and Finance = 20%; Total Dimension = 36%. At the same time, we
consider the R&D sector. R&D expenditures comes from Business + Government + Higher Education.
Looking at Office for National Statistics data - for UK (1999), expenditure on R&D are divided as:
England: Business=1.4 ; Government = 0.2 ; Higher Education (University) = 0.4; Total Dimension=
2%.
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manufacturing processes and new products. In particular, we refer to the value of time
engineers spend developing more efficient production methods, the time managers spend
matching people with tasks (i.e. engineers with particular problems), as well as other
similar activities (investment in organizational capital). It is difficult to determine the
exact size, but Parente and Prescott guestimate that firms’ investment in organizational
capital may be around 12% of GDP and part of it can be included in the R&D sector.
Similarly let data on the real interest rate, the long-term growth rate be denoted
by rˆ and gˆ respectively. Given parameters Θ, we can then solve for the balanced growth
steady state with values g(Θ), r(Θ), pm(Θ)X(Θ), py(Θ)Y (Θ), pz(Θ)Z(Θ), sLj(Θ), sHj(Θ),
j = i,m, y, z. Given data for these variables we can then solve
g(Θ) = gˆ
r(Θ) = rˆ
sLj(Θ) = sˆLj ; j = i,m, y
sHj(Θ) = sˆHj ; j = i,m, y
pm(Θ)X(Θ)
py(Θ)Y (Θ) + pz(Θ)Z(Θ)
=
p̂mX
pyY + pzZ
Data Value Source
rˆ 0.03 stylized
gˆ 0.07 stylized
pmX 0.36 Burda and Hunt (2001)
pyY 0.29 Burda and Hunt (2001)
pzZ 0.35 Burda and Hunt (2001)
sLy 0.27 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sHy 0.43 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sLm 0.17 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sHm 0.50 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sLi 0.076 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
sHi 0.882 Keuschnigg and Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
Table 4. Data used in Calibration
For data, we choose rˆ = 0.03 and gˆ = 0.06. Since all growth in our model is concentrated
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in the manufacturing sector of size θm, this gives long-term GDP growth as θmgˆ = 2.2%
in our calibration. Table 5 summarizes the baseline calibration.
In our results the size of the R&D sector is around 5%. Previously, we review estimates
of the size of the R&D which suggest a value around only 2%. However some R&D must be
contained within unobserved ‘intangible’ investment (Parente and Prescott (2000)). The
size of actual as opposed to observed R&D in our model is therefore not implausible. Note
also that our simulations show a skilled/unskilled wage ratio of 2:1 which is reasonable,
given the broad definition of ‘skilled’ labour that makes it half the working population 19.
Parameter Value Source
H¯ 0.5 Keuschnigg-Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
L¯ 0.5 ditto
σ 0.4 Ogaki and Reinhart (1998)
α 0.7 Keuschnigg-Kohler (1999a, 1999b)
δ 0.1 Canova and Ortega (1996)
µj , ηj , 0.0 (i.e., Cobb-Douglas) Hamermesh (1993), GTAP
Ti 2.4 Calibrated
ρ 0.01 Calibrated
θm 0.46 Calibrated
γky ; k = 1, 2 γ1y = sLy = 0.27, γ2y = sHy = 0.43 Calibrated
γkm ; k = 1, 2 γ1m = sLm = 0.17, γ2m = sHm = 0.50 Calibrated
γki ; k = 1, 2 γ1i = sLi = 0.076, γ2i = sHi = 0.882 Calibrated
Table 5. Summary of Baseline Calibration
B Terms of trade
On the terms of trade, first consider a price index of traded goods:
P bT = (p
b
m)
wb(py)1−wb ; b = E,W (B.1)
where
wb =
θbm
θbm + θby
(B.2)
19γ2y = sHy, γ1y = sLy, etc. Also γ3y = γ4y and the same for the other sectors.
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Now define the terms of trade in the West as
τW ≡ P
E
T
PWT
=
(pEm)
wE (py)1−wE
(pWm )wW (py)1−wW
(B.3)
and τE ≡ 1
τW
. Hence if wE = wW = w, say, which we assume in our calibration, then the
terms of trade simply become
τW =
(
pEm
pWm
)w
(B.4)
and therefore the price of the traditional traded goods have no impact on the terms of
trade. If preference parameters differ this is no longer the case.
C Stability and Transitional Dynamics (NOT FOR PUBLI-
CATION)
In the paper we have studied the balanced-growth steady state of the model. The full
dynamic model has transitional dynamics and could in principle be unstable in the vicinity
of the steady state. This section uses WINSOLVE20 to confirms numerically, for central
parameter values, that the model is indeed saddle-path stable and examines the speed of
convergence towards the steady state. Figures 6 to 11 show the dynamic adjustment of
various endogenous variables of interest as the Western population jumps by 10% from
immigration with no skill bias. We assume TFPW /TFPE = 1.75, LW = HW = 0.25 and
LE = 0.30 HE = 0.20. With this assumption, we are in a position to make a comparison
with the balanced-growth steady state reported in the paper.
Figure 6 (figure 6-11 are not for publication, but available from the authors) shows
the effect of migration on the growth rate.21 In the figure, we report the pre-migration
and post-migration values plus the dynamic adjustment. As verified in section 6, the
growth rate increases as a result of migration from a country with a low TFP to one with
a high TFP. The growth rate (a forward-looking variable) jumps and overshoots the new
steady-state value and then slowly converges the the steady-state value at the maximum
migration level. It takes about 5 years to reach and then overshoot the steady state.
20A program written by Richard Pierce for solving and simulating nonlinear models
21Pre- and post-migration growth rates are denoted by gpre ss and gpost ss respectively. Growth in year
t, g(t) is denoted by g dyn. Similarly for other variables.
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Figures 7 to 9 describe the effect of migration with no skill bias on sector shares. As
shown in the paper, now the West diverts resources from the traditional to the manufac-
turing sector while the sector shares for the East have an opposite shift. Sector adjustment
is plausibly slow: it takes about 20 years for the sector shares to achieve half of its even-
tual adjustment to the new steady-state value in the West. Adjustment is slower in the
East. The reason for this is seen from figure 10 describing the transitional dynamics for
the relative skilled-unskilled wage ratio in the two blocs. Relative wages adjust almost
completely in the West after 10 years, at which time the East has not yet completed half
its long-run adjustment.
Finally, figure 11 shows the transitional dynamic for the share of new products. As
shown previously, Western new product share increases and the dynamic adjustment
(which by definition is symmetric between blocs) takes about 20 years to complete half
the long-run adjustment. Overall, this exercise confirms that the full dynamic model is
stable in the vicinity of the steady-state. Growth adjusts more quickly than sector shares.
The reason for this result lies in the forward-looking and labour-intensive nature of the
R&D sector. This causes growth, driven by R&D, to respond quickly; output in the man-
ufacturing and traditional sectors requires physical capital investment and adjusts more
slowly. The larger R&D sector in the West then sees relative wages and therefore sector
shares changing more rapidly in that bloc (figure 11).
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Figure 1: No-Skill bias migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0.20 ; LE =
0.30 ; HW = LW = 0.25 ; TFPE = 1.75TFPW
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Figure 2: No-Skill bias Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0.20 ; LE =
0.30 ; HW = LW = 0.25 ; TFPE = 1.75TFPW
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Figure 3: High Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0.20 ; LE =
0.30 ; HW = LW = 0.25 ; TFPE = 1.75TFPW
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(b) EASTERN SECTOR SHARES
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Figure 4: High Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0.20 ; LE =
0.30 ; HW = LW = 0.25 ; TFPE = 1.75TFPW
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Figure 5: Low Skilled Migration with Pre-Migration Labour: HE = 0.20 ; LE =
0.30 ; HW = LW = 0.25 ; TFPE = 1.75TFPW
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Figure 6: NOT for PUBLICATION Dynamic Simulation for Average Growth
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Figure 7: NOT for PUBLICATION Dynamic Simulation for East and West
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Figure 8: NOT for PUBLICATION Dynamic Simulation for East and West
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Figure 9: NOT for PUBLICATION Dynamic Simulation for East and West
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Figure 10: NOT for PUBLICATION Dynamic Simulation for East and West
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